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III. CORPORATE & SECURITiES LAW
Interpreting the Williams Act's Requirements For Disclosure
of A Tender Offeror's Financing: IU International Corp. v.
NX Acquisition Corp.
Congress enacted the Williams Act' in 1968 to include tender offers
within the coverage of federal security laws. 2 In drafting the Williams Act,
Congress intended to require bidders in tender offers to disclose relevant
information to shareholders of target companies and to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).3 Congress intended that shareholders in a
tender offer would receive information regarding a bidder's qualifications
and intentions before the bidder required the shareholders to respond to
the bidder's offer. 4 Accordingly, the Williams Act requires a bidder to
include in the bidder's disclosures to shareholders and the SEC the sources
of the funds that the bidder will use to purchase tendered shares. 5 Further-
more, the SEC promulgated regulations pursuant to the Williams Act that
require a bidder to disclose the names of the parties to the loan transaction
1. Securities-Corporate Equity Ownership-Disclosure Act (Williams Act), Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1982 & Supp.
1986)).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADomm. NEws 2811 [hereinafter HoUsE REPORT] (stating that purpose of Williams Act is to
require disclosure of pertinent information to shareholders in tender offer or in corporate
stock repurchase plan). Until the Williams Act became law, federal securities laws required
disclosure only in proxy contests. Id. at 2813. In a tender offer the offeror seeks corporate
control like the initiator of a proxy contest. Id. Because tender offers affect shareholders of
the target company much like a proxy contest, Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, sought
to protect shareholders of the target companies. Id.
3. Id. at 2811. The Williams Act allows management of a target company an opportunity
to communicate management's position on the tender offer to the shareholders of the target
company. Id. Congress intended that the Williams Act would not favor either a bidder or a
target company in a tender offer. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2813; see also Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975) (interpreting legislative history of Williams
Act as Congress' intention not to provide management weapons in defending against tender
offers). Congress, in limiting the substantive requirements of the Williams Act, empowered
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to decide which specific bidder disclosures
sufficiently would protect shareholders. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), (2) (1982). Pursuant to the
authority that the Williams Act granted the SEC, the SEC issued regulations that specify the
timing and the contents of bidders' disclosures in tender offers. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-
.14e (1988) (stating SEC disclosure requirements of bidders in tender offers); see also infra
note 6 (listing specific SEC requirements).
4. House REPORT, supra note 2, at 2813; see infra note 64 and accompanying text
(discussing United States Supreme Court's interpretation that Williams Act, by requiring
bidders to make disclosures, protects shareholders).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1982).
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and the loan's maturity date, collateral, and applicable interest rate if the
bidder uses borrowed funds to purchase the shares of a target company. 6
Although the Williams Act and SEC regulations require a bidder in a tender
offer to include information describing the bidder's arrangements for fi-
nancing the bidder's offer, neither the Williams Act nor the SEC explicitly
requires a bidder to have secured commitments for financing (firm financing)
before a bidder may initiate a tender offer. 7 In IU International Corp. v.
NX Acquisition Corp.' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether the Williams Act and SEC regulations governing
disclosure by a bidder implicitly require a tender offeror either to have firm
financing before the offeror commences a tender offer or to disclose in the
bidder's original disclosures to shareholders and the SEC the expected
sources and terms of prospective financing.9
In IU NEOAX Inc. formed NX Acquisition Corporation (NX) to make
a tender offer for the shares of IU International Corporation (IU). 0 NX,
in initiating the tender offer, filed disclosure documents with the SEC and
transmitted to IU shareholders an offer to purchase all IU shares for $17.50
per share until February 3, 1988." NX's offer to IU shareholders disclosed
commitments from banks to lend $311 million to NEOAX for the purchase
of IU shares.' 2 The offer also disclosed NEOAX's intention to raise an
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240d-100, sched. 14D-1, item 4 (special instructions for complying
with sched. 14D-1) (1988) (providing that bidder must disclose summary of each borrowing
transaction). The SEC requires a bidder to disclose the terms of the bidder's offer, the identity
and background of the bidder, and the bidder's past contacts with the target company. Id. at
items 1-3 (special instructions for complying with sched. 14D-1). A bidder also must disclose
the purpose of the bidder's offer and the bidder's plans for the target company. Id. at item
5 (special instructions for complying with sched. 14D-l). Furthermore, a bidder must include
in the bidder's disclosures to the SEC and shareholders of the target company any interest
that the bidder holds in the securities of the target company and any contracts that the bidder
has with the target company. Id. at items 6, 7 (special instructions for complying with sched.
14D-1). Finally, under the SEC regulations, a bidder must disclose the names of persons that
will solicit shares on behalf of the bidder, financial statements of the bidder if the bidder is
not a natural person, and other information that is material to shareholders' decisions whether
to accept or reject the bidder's offer, Id. at items 8-10 (special instructions for complying with
sched. 14D-l).
7. See Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens, 831 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir. 1987)
(determining that text of Williams Act is silent on whether bidder must have firm financing
to initiate tender offer). The Newmont Mining court reasoned that neither the Williams Act
nor SEC regulations provide that a bidder must disclose all financing information in the
bidder's initial disclosures to the SEC and shareholders of the target company. Id.
8. 840 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988).
9, IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd
en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988).
10. Id. at 220-221.
11. Id. In 1U, after NX made NX's initial offer to purchase IU shares at $17.50 per
share, NX, by amending NX's offer, later raised NX's offering price to $20.00 per share and
extended the expiration date of NX's offer to February 12, 1988. Id. at 221.
12. Id. In IU bank commitments to finance NX's offer totalled $416 million but only
$311 million was for the purchase of IU shares. Id, NX intended that the remaining $105
million of the bank commitments would refinance existing debts of NEOAX. Id.
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additional $400 million for the IU purchase by selling NEOAX's debt
securities and preferred stock through Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel
Burnham), an investment banking firm. 3 In NX's offer to IU shareholders,
NX disclosed that Drexel Burnham had issued a letter to NX that expressed
Drexel Burnham's confidence in arranging financing for NX's tender offer.' 4
Because Drexel Burnham had not sold the $400 million worth of NEOAX's
debt securities and preferred stock to investors prior to NX's offer to
purchase IU shares, NX could not disclose to IU shareholders the sources
and terms of NEOAX's prospective $400 million financing arrangement.'
In response to NX's offer for IU shares, IU filed an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland.' 6 IU requested
the district court to enjoin NX's tender offer. 17 IU complained that NX, in
falling to disclose in NX's initial disclosure either firm financing or the
expected sources and terms for the $400 million financing that Drexel
Burnham was going to arrange, violated the Williams Act and SEC regu-
lations.' 8 IU further claimed that because NX had not disclosed the expected
sources and terms of NEOAX's prospective $400 million financing in NX's
initial offer, IU shareholders had insufficient time and information to
evaluate the terms of NEOAX's prospective financing before NX's offer
forced IU shareholders to decide whether to sell or whether to retain IU
shares.' 9 The district court denied IU's motion for a preliminary injunction
against NX's tender offer.2° IU appealed the district court's decision to the
13. See id. (stating that Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel Burnham) intended to
raise $360 million through sale of NEOAX's debt securities and $40 million through sale of
NEOAX's preferred stock).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 222 (stating that bidder cannot disclose sources and terms of financing
that does not exist). NX's disclosure to the SEC and IU shareholders, however, indicated that
Dyson-Kissner-Morgan Corporation, a defendant in IU, had committed to buy $10 million
worth of NEOAX's preferred stock through Drexel Burnham. Id. at 221.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. In IU's complaint, IU did not allege that NX withheld information in NX's
initial disclosure to IU shareholders, but alleged that the Williams Act required more substantial
steps in acquiring firm financing than NX took before NX made an offer to IU shareholders.
Id. IU charged that NX should have been able to disclose expected sources and expected terms
of financing when NX made an offer to IU shareholders. Id.
19. Id. at 223. In IU's complaint, IU claimed that a bidder's financing information is
material to shareholders because financing terms are evidence of a bidder's strength and can
affect the future performance and dividends of the target company if the bidder's offer
succeeds. Id. IU, therefore, claimed that IU shareholders needed to receive information on
NX's sources and terms of financing in NX's initial disclosures to IU shareholders. Id.
20. Id. at 221. In denying IU's motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court
in IU used three factors of a four factor test. Id. First, the district court in IU determined
that the harm to NX from an injuction of NX's tender offer is greater than the harm to IU
should NX's offer continue. Id. Second, the district court in IU determined that IU did not
show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of IU's claims. Id. Finally, the district court
reasoned that a preliminary injunction against NX would not serve the public interest. Id. The
district court did not address the requirement that IU had to show irreparable harm to IU
19891
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.2'
In affirming the district court's decision to deny IU's motion, the
Fourth Circuit in IU held that IU had no chance of success on the merits
of IU's claims and that IU had failed to show that IU shareholders would
suffer irreparable harm if the court did not enjoin NX's tender offer.22 In
the IU court's analysis of IU's claims, the IU court applied the same test
that the district court used to deny IU's motion to enjoin NX's tender
offer.? The IU court determined that IU had no chance of success on the
merits of IU's claims because the IU court reasoned that the Williams Act
requires a bidder to disclose only existing firm financing, not prospective
financing. 24 The IU court, in requiring a bidder to disclose only firm
financing, reasoned that a bidder's prospective financing arrangement was
not an essential element of a bidder's offer.25 The IU court narrowly
construed the Williams Act to require that a bidder's initial offer must
contain only the bidder's identity, the number of shares that the bidder
seeks, the price of the offer and the expiration date of the offer.26 In
narrowly construing the substantive requirements of the Williams Act, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the Williams Act requites a bidder to inform
shareholders that the tender offer is contingent upon the bidder receiving
financing if the bidder does not have firm financing at the time of the
bidder's initial disclosures. 27 The IU court emphasized that Congress intended
shareholders if the court allowed NX~s tender offer to continue. Id.; see also Blackwelder
Furniture Co. v. Selig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating four factor test
that appellate courts should consider in reviewing decisibns on motions for preliminary
injunctions).
21. IU, 840 F.2d at 221. In IU a majority of a tlired judge panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of IU's motion for a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 225. IU petitioned the Court df Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
for a rehearing eh banc. Id. at 228. The full court granted IU's petition for rehearing. Id.
The full court then affirmed the district court's deni.l of IU's motion for a preliminary
injunction. IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 229, 229 (4th Cir. 1988). A
majority of the full court in IU agreed with the reasoning of the majority of the three judge
panel. Id.
22. IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd
en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988).
23. See supra note 20 (discussing four factor test that district court applied in denying
IU's motion for preliminary injuction of NX's tender offer).
24. Id. at 222.
25. Id. at 223. The IU court, ii reasoning that a bidder's piospective financing arrange-
ment is not an essential element of a bidder's offer, determined that the identity of the bidder,
the number of shares that the bidder seeks, and the offer's price and expiration date are
essential to a bidder's tender offer. Id. The 1U court, therefore, determined that a bidder must
disclose the essential elements of the bidder's offer to shareholders and the SEC before the
bidder's offer is valid. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The IU court reasoned that although the Williams Act is primarily a disclosure
statute, the Williams Act has some substantive effects. Id. The IU court reasoned that, if a
bidder does not have firm financing, a bidder is unable disclose the terms and sources of
financing. Id. at 222. Furthermore, the IU court recognized that when the bidder's financing
becomes firm, the Williams Act requires a bidder to amend the bidder's disclosure statement
and possibly to extend the offer's expiration date. Id. at 223.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
that the Williams Act would favor neither incumbent management of the
target company nor the bidder in a tender offer.28 Accordingly, the IU
court reasoned that a broader construction of the Williams Act that would
require bidders either to have and disclose firm financing or to disclose
expected sources and terms of financing would favor target companies and
frustrate Congress' policy of neutrality in tender offers. 29 The IU court
determined that a narrow construction of the substantive requirements of
the Williams Act adheres to Congess' intent that the Williams Act favor
neither a bidder nor a target company in a tender offer.3 0 The IU court,
therefore, reasoned that NX, in disclosing that NEOAX's prospective $400
million financing was contingent upon Drexel Burnham's sale of NEOAX's
debt and preferred stock, sufficiently complied with the substantive require-
ments of the Williams Act."
In determining that NX's disclosures complied with the Williams Act,
the IU court agreed with the interpretation of the Williams Act that the
SEC, as amicus curiae, presented to the IU court. 32 The IU court reasoned
that Congress in the Williams Act gave the SEC broad discretion to
determine specific disclosure requirements in tender offers.33 The IU court
noted that neither Congress nor the SEC require a bidder to have firm
financing or to disclose expected sources and terms of the bidder's pro-
spective financing.3 4 In response to IU's argument that the SEC previously
had interpreted the Williams Act to require firm financing, the IU court
28. See id. at 222, 223 (recognizing that Congress intended Williams Act to remain
neutral between bidder and target company in takeover attempt). The IU court reasoned that
by narrowly construing the substantive provisions of the Williams Act, the IU court would
respect Congress' intent of neutrality between a bidder and a target company. Id. at 223. The
IU court cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.
to support the IU court's conclusion that Congress intended that the Williams Act would
maintain neutrality between a bidder and a target company. Id.; see also Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (discussing Congress' intentions in passing Williams Act);
infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Rondeau Court's determination that drafters
of Williams Act took extreme care not to favor management of target company or bidder in
takeover attempt).
29. IU, 840 F.2d at 223. The 1U court acknowledged that requiring a bidder to disclose
the expected sources and terms of the bidder's financing for a tender offer may pose minor
obstacles to the bidder. Id. The IU court, nevertheless, reasoned that imposing even a minor
obstacle would favor a target company over a bidder. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 222.
32. Id. In IU the SEC as amicus curiae argued that neither the Williams Act nor SEC
regulations require a particular state of financing before a bidder may commence a tender
offer. Id. at 222, 224.
33. See id. at 224 (determining that Congress left within SEC's discretion specific
disclosure requirements for bidder in tender offer); see also Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens,
831 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1981) (determining that Congress gave SEC latitude to decide
which specific disclosure requirements are necessary to protect shareholders of target company);
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988) (authorizing SEC to prescibe rules and regulations necessary or
appropriate to public interest or to protect shareholders).
34. IU, 840 F.2d at 224, 225.
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found no inconsistencies between past SEC positions and the SEC's current
position on the firm financing issue.35 Because the Williams Act is silent on
the firm financing issue and delegates authority to the SEC to determine
specific disclosure requirements, the IU court, therefore, deferred to the
SEC's interpretation in the SEC's amicus curiae brief that the Williams Act
did not require a bidder either to have and disclose firm financing or to
disclose expected sources and terms of prospective financing. 6
In addition to determining that IU had no chance of success on the
merits of IU's claims, the IU court also determined that IU did not show
that NX's failure to disclose expected sources and terms of the prospective
$400 million financing would cause irreparable harm to IU shareholders."
The IU court reasoned that the Williams Act requires a bidder to disclose
material information to protect shareholders of the target company." After
noting the potential harms to shareholders if a bidder fails to disclose the
actual sources and terms of the bidder's financing for a tender offer, the
IU court reasoned that requiring NX to disclose the expected sources and
terms of the Drexel Burnham arrangement would not insure that IU share-
holders would receive the material information on the actual sources and
terms of NEOAX's $400 million financing.39 The IU court further reasoned
that under NX's proposal to disclose the actual sources and terms of the
Drexel Burnham financing arrangement at least five days before the offer
expired, IU shareholders would have sufficient time to consider the actual
35. Id. In IU IU stated that in 1970 the SEC testified in Senate committee hearings that
the SEC had enjoined a tender offer because the bidder did not have sufficient funds with
which to pay for the bidder's offer. Id. at 224. IU argued that the SEC testimony in 1970
indicates that the SEC previously had required a bidder to have firm financing before the
bidder commences a tender offer. Id. The IU court determined that the SEC's testimony on
enjoining a tender offer when a bidder could not pay for shares that the bidder sought referred
to fraud, not disclosure. Id. The IU court reasoned that the SEC may have enjoined the
tender offer in 1970 for practices other than a lack of firm financing. Id. The IU court also
reasoned that because the SEC never issued a regulation requiring firm financing by a bidder,
the SEC never considered that a bidder's lack of firm financing violated the Williams Act.
Id.
36. Id. at 224.
37. Id. at 223.
38. See id. at 222 (discussing decision of United States Supreme Court in Rondeau,
which held that Williams Act, in requiring bidder's disclosures, protected shareholders in
tender offers); see also infra notes 64, 65 and accompanying text (discussing Rondeau Court's
interpretation of purpose of Williams Act); supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Williams Act).
39. IU, 840 F.2d at 223. In IU IU argued that shareholders in a tender offer need
information concerning the bidder's financing to determine the financial strength of the bidder
and the future performance of the target company if the bidder's offer succeeds. Id. The IU
court, however, determined that disclosure of a bidder's expected sources and terms of financing
does not give shareholders of the target company information on sources and terms of a
bidder's firm financing. Id. The IU court, in reasoning that information on a bidder's expected
sources and terms of financing did not aid shareholders in a tender offer, characterized an
amendment to a statement of expected sources and terms of financing as an amendment to a
statement of nothing. Id.
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sources and terms of NEOAX's $400 million financing before deciding to
sell or retain IU stock.40 The IU court determined that, in tender offers,
shareholders generally will receive information on a bidder's firm financing
because the bidder usually will have firm financing before the bidder's offer
expires. 4' The IU court reasoned that bidders usually will have firm financing
because of pressure from shareholders of the target company for a bidder's
financing information and the SEC's requirement of prompt payment upon
expiration of a tender offer.42 The IU court, therefore, determined that IU
failed to show that NX's disclosures harmed IU shareholders and that IU
failed to show that a disclosure of expected sources and terms of NX's
prospective financing would benefit IU shareholders.
43
In contrast to the majority's reasoning in IU, the dissenting opinion in
IU determined that the language of the Williams Act requires a bidder to
disclose the sources and terms of financing for the bidder's offer at least
twenty days before the bidder's offer expires. 44 The dissenting opinion
reasoned that the sources and terms of the borrowed funds, even if con-
ditional or contingent upon some event, are material to a shareholder's
decision whether to sell or whether to retain the shareholder's shares in the
target company. 45 The dissenting opinion determined that information on a
bidder's expected sources and ferms of financing helps the shareholder to
assess the probability of payment from the bidder.46 In response to the
40. See id. (reasoning that amendment by NX to NX's original filing disclosing firm
financing five days before expiration of offer would give shareholders sufficient time in which
to revoke tender).
41. Id. at 223-224.
42. Id.; vee 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(c) (1988) (requiring that, if shareholders accept bidder's
offer, bidder must pay shareholders wit}iri prompt period of time after bidder's offer expires).
The court in IU acknowledged that under current SEC practices payment is prompt if a bidder
pays shareholders within five days of the expiratioli date of the bidder's offer. IU, 840 F.2d
at 223.
43. IM, 840 F.2d at 222-223.
44. See id. at 225 (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (finding no need to look behind terms of
Williams Act or SEC regulation§ to der¢rmine what bidder must disclose). In IU the dissenting
opinion determined that the Willies Act specifically requires a bidder to file a statement with
the SEC that identifies the sources of the funds that the bidder will use to purchase the shares
that the bidder seeks. Id. at 225-226. The dissenting opinion also determined that the SEC
regulations clearly require a bidder to summarize in the bidder's filing with the SEC the
agreement for any lan agreement that the bidder will use to finance the bidder's offer. Id.
45. Id. at 27 (Winter, C.J., dissenting) The dissenting opinion in IU reasoned that the
Williams Act does not require a bidder to complete all details of the bidder's financing before
the bidder commences a tender offer. Id. at 225. The dissent, however, reasoned that, before
a bidder makps a tender offer, the financing source must make a commitment to the bidder
to provide financing for the bidder's offer. Id. at 227. The dissenting opinion recognized that
a lender may make the lender's commitment to a bidder to finance a tender offer contingent
upon an event or upon the bidder meeting a certain condition. Id. at 225. The dissent
determined that a bare assertion in the bidder's disclosure that a third party was confident of
success in arranging financing for the bidder's offer does not satisfy the requirements of the
Williams Act for disclosure of the sources and terms of a bidder's financing. Id.
46. Id. at 227. (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
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argument that a bidder may amend the bidder's original filing with the
SEC to reflect changes in tender offer financing, the dissenting opinion
determined that the bidder still must allow shareholders a minimum of
twenty days to consider the bidder's sources and terms of financing. 47
In addressing to the majority's position in IU that generally a bidder
will have firm financing before the bidder's offer expires, the dissenting
opinion reasoned that the SEC's prompt payment regulations may not force
a bidder to have firm financing before a bidder's offer expires. 4 The
dissenting opinion in IU suggested that, if an offer expired without firm
financing, the bidder would have no legal duty to disclose the terms of
contingent financing after the offer expired.4 9 The IU dissent, therefore,
reasoned that, if the offer expired without firm financing, shareholders that
faced a tender offer never would know the sources and terms of the bidder's
financing. 0 The dissenting opinion in IU reasoned that Congress, in drafting
the Williams Act, did not intend to rely on economic reality to force a
bidder to disclose the sources and terms of financing to the shareholders
of a target company." Rather, the dissenting opinion reasoned that, re-
gardless of economic conditions, Congress intended that the Williams Act
would require a bidder to disclose the sources and terms of a bidder's
financing 2 Reasoning that the Williams Act requires disclosure of contin-
gent sources and terms of financing in a bidder's initial offer, the dissent
would have granted IU's request for an injunction that would have lasted
until NX disclosed to IU shareholders the contingent sources and terms of
NEOAX's financing.
53
47. Id. at 228 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). In IUthe dissenting opinion viewed as imperative
the disclosure of terms and sources at least twenty days before the offer's expiration date. Id.
The dissenting opinion did not interpret the Williams Act to allow the bidder to decide when
to disclose material information to shareholders. Id.
48. Id. at 228 n.6 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). In 1U the dissenting opinion determined
that the SEC was relying on pressure from the prompt payment requirement to force a bidder
to receive firm financing before the bidder's offer expired. Id. The dissenting opinion, however,
asserted that the Williams Act clearly did not make a bidder's financial disclosures dependent
upon a requirement that the bidder pay the shareholders promptly after the tender offer
expires. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(c) (1988) (requiring, upon expiration of tender offer,
offeror either to pay shareholders promptly or to return shares to shareholders promptly).
49. Id. (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances in which SEC
regulations would not require bidder's disclosure of sources and terms of financing to
shareholders of target company).
51. IU, 840 F.2d. at 228 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Winter, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion determined that NX's failure
to disclose the expected sources and terms of NX's $400 million financing harmed IU
shareholders. Id. The dissenting opinion also determined that IU had a strong likelihood of
success on the merits of IU's claims under the Williams Act. Id. The dissenting opinion stated
that NX's failure to disclose expected terms of NX's financing deprived IU shareholders of
IU shareholders' statutory right under the Williams Act to receive material information from
NX concerning NX's offer. Id.
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In IU the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals properly determined that
IU had no chance of success on the merits of IU's claims because Congress
intended that the Williams Act would maintain neutrality between a bidder
and a target company in a tender offer.5 4 The United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the legislative history of the Williams Act in Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp.55 supports the IU court's view of the Williams Act
and Congress' intent in drafting the Williams Act. 6 In Rondeau Francis
Rondeau admitted that he had violated the Williams Act by not filing a
disclosure form with the SEC within ten days after Rondeau acquired more
than five percent of Mosinee's outstanding shares of stocky Mosinee
brought an action against Rondeau in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin." Mosinee requested that the district
court permanently enjoin Rondeau from purchasing additional Mosinee
stock or voting the stock that Rondeau ownedA9 Mosinee further requested
that the court require Rondeau to divest Rondeau's interest in Mosinee.
60
The district court denied Mosinee's motion for a permanent injunction and
granted Rondeau's motion for summary judgment because Mosinee failed
to show that Rondeau's actions irreparably would harm Mosinee's share-
holders.61 In reversing the district court, the United States Court of Appeals
54. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing 1U court's interpretation of
Williams Act); infra notes 64, 65 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's interpretation in Rondeau that Congress intended Williams Act to maintain neutrality
in tender offers).
55. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
56. See infra notes 64, 65 (discussing Rondeau Court's interpretation of Congress' intent
in enacting Williams Act).
57. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1975). In Rondeau Rondeau
testified that Rondeau purchased Mosinee's stock under the mistaken belief that the law
required a stockholder to file a disclosure only after the stockholder acquired more than ten
percent of a public company's stock. Id. at 55 n.4. When Rondeau discovered that the
threshold percentage for shareholder disclosure was 5%, Rondeau disclosed to the SEC
Rondeau's background, sources of funds, purpose in purchasing Mosinee's stock, and contracts
or arrangements with Mosinee. Id. at 51-53 n.1; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982)
(requiring shareholder to file disclosure with SEC within 10 days after shareholder acquires
more than 5% of stock in public company). Rondeau filed Rondeau's disclosure with the SEC
more than three months after Rondeau acquired more than five percent of Mosinee's stock.
Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 55.
58. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 54.
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id. In Rondeau, in addition to Mosinee's request for a permanent injunction against
Rondeau, Mosinee moved for a preliminary injunction against Rondeau, but later withdrew
the motion. Id. In Rondeau Mosinee's complaint alleged that Rondeau and the two banks
that had financed Rondeau's purchases schemed to defraud Mosinee shareholders. Id. at 54.
Mosinee further alleged in Rondeau that Rondeau harmed the shareholders who had sold
Mosinee stock to Rondeau because the shareholders had not received the information concerning
Rondeau's financing that the Williams Act required Rondeau to disclose. Id. at 55-56. Mosinee
also alleged that Rondeau's failure to disclose denied Mosinee a chance to communicate
Mosinee's position to Mosinee shareholders. Id. at 55.
61. Id. at 56. In determining that Rondeau had not harmed Mosinee shareholders
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for the Seventh Circuit determined that Mosinee, after establishing that
Rondeau violated the Williams Act, did not need to show that Rondeau
irreparably would have harmed Mosinee shareholders.6 2 In reversing the
Seventh Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme Court in Rondeau
determined that, because an injunction is an equitable remedy, traditional
equitable principles, including a showing of irreparable harm by the mover,
should apply to a motion for an injunction that would prevent further
violation of the Williams Act.63 The Rondeau Court analyzed the congres-
sional reports on the Williams Act and determined that, by requiring a
bidder to disclose information relevant to the shareholder's decision to sell
or retain the target company's shares, Congress intended to protect share-
holders of target companies. 64 The Rondeau Court determined that the
legislative history of the Williams Act emphasized that Congress intended
the Williams Act to remain neutral between a bidder and a target company
in a tender offer.65 The IU court, in following the Rondeau court's inter-
irreparably, the district court in Rondeau also held that Rondeau and the two banks that
financed Rondeau's purchases of Mosinee's stock did not conspire to defraud Mosinee
shareholders. Id.
62. Id. at 57.
63. Id. at 64. The Supreme Court in Rondeau determined that although Mosinee proved
that Rondeau had violated the Williams Act, before a court could grant injunctive relief to
Mosinee, Mosinee needed to show irreparable harm to Mosinee shareholders. Id. at 65. The
Rondeau Court, in examining the harms that Mosinee claimed, determined that, because
Rondeau had not made a tender offer for control of Mosinee and had filed the proper
disclosure statements with the SEC, Rondeau did not harm either current Mosinee shareholders
or Mosinee. Id. at 59. The Rondeau Court also determined that, if Rondeau harmed the
persons who sold Rondeau the stock, those persons had an adequate remedy at law in damages
and, therefore, did not need to seek injunctive relief. Id. at 60.
64. Id. at 58; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (determining that
Congress by requiring bidder to make disclosures to shareholders of target companies intended
to protect shareholders in tender offers); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977)
(determining that legislative history shows that Congress' only design in enacting Williams Act
was to ensure that adequate information reached shareholders in tender offer). The Rondeau
Court noted that Congress intended that the Williams Act would allow shareholders in a
tender offer to make informed decisions whether to sell or whether to retain shares of the
target company. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58.
Congress in the legislative history of the Williams Act observed that tender offers provide
a check on inefficient management of public companies. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at
2813. The legislative history also stated that the Williams Act avoids regulation that favors
either management of a target company or a bidder. Id. The drafters of the Williams Act
designed the Williams Act to provide equal opportunity for both the bidder and the management
of the target company to communicate to the shareholders in a tender offer. Id.
65. See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58 (determining that legislative history of Williams Act
shows that Congress in maintaing neutrality did not intend to give target companies weapon
with which to discourage takeovers); see also MITE, 457 U.S. at 634 (determining that Congress
intended to balance shareholder protection with interests of bidder and target company); Piper,
430 U.S. at 30-31 (determining that drafters of Williams Act designed Williams Act to favor
neither bidder nor target company); Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d
Cir. 1985) (reasoning that Congress considered neutrality between target company and bidder
crucial to Williams Act).
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pretation of the Williams Act as remaining neutral in a tender offer,
narrowly construed the substantive requirements of the Williams Act to
adhere to Congress' intention of not favoring either a bidder or a target
company. 6 The IU court, therefore, properly determined that NX's disclo-
sure of Drexel Burnham's letter that stated Drexel Burnham's confidence
in arranging financing for NX's tender offer met the substantive require-
ments of the Williams Act.67
In addition to determining that NX's disclosure of only Drexel Burn-
ham's highly confident letter met the substantive requirements of the Wil-
liams Act, the IU court also properly determined that NX's failure to
disclose the expected sources and terms of NX's prospective financing would
not irreparably harm IU shareholders." A bidder's disclosure of the expected
sources and terms of prospective financing for a tender offer would not
provide the shareholders of a target company with the actual sources and
terms of a bidder's financing that the Williams Act requires the bidder to
disclose.69 Also, in IU NX proposed to disclose the actual sources and terms
of NX's firm financing at least five days before NX's offer expired. 70 After
NX discloses the actual sources and terms of NX's financing, the SEC has
the power to extend NX's offer to ensure that IU shareholders have sufficient
time to consider NX's firm financing before NX's offer expires.7 1 Also, the
SEC regulations requiring prompt payment by the bidder after the bidder's
offer expires usually will cause a bidder to have firm financing before the
bidder's offer expires. 72 As the court in IU reasoned, fraud provisions of
66. See supra notes 28, 38 and accompanying text (discussing IU court's reliance on
Supreme Court's interpretation in Rondeau of congressional purpose and intent behind Williams
Act).
67. See supra notes 64, 65 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which United
States Supreme Court has interpreted legislative history of Williams Act); supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing 1U court's reliance on Rondeau Court's interpretation of
Williams Act).
68. See supra note 39 (discussing 1U court's reasoning that IU shareholders would not
benefit from NX's disclosure of expected sources and terms of $400 million financing for
NX's offer); infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (analyzing IU court's reasoning that IU
shareholders would not benefit from NX's disclosure of expected sources and terms of NX's
financing for NX's offer).
69. See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text (discussing Williams Act's and SEC's
requirements for bidder's disclosure of financing for tender offer); see also 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-6(d) (1988) (requiring bidder to disclose material changes to bidder's original offer).
70. IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 1988) aff'd en
banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988).
71. See Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens, 831 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1987)
(determining that Williams Act authorizes the SEC to prescribe extensions of time of tender
offers to allow shareholders to review bidder's amendments if additional time is necessary);
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1982) (authorizing SEC to make rules to protect shareholders or public
interest if material changes in bidder's tender offer occur); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1988)
(allowing shareholders in tender offer to withdraw shares until point at which bidder's offer
expires).
72. See Newmont Mining, 831 F.2d at 1453 (9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging SEC position
that bidder must pay shareholders promptly after offer expires); see supra note 48 and
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the Williams Act and SEC regulations protect shareholders if a bidder that
has firm financing does not disclose the actual sources and terms of the
bidder's financing to shareholders of the target company. 73 The IU court,
therefore, correctly determined that NX's disclosure of only the letter from
Drexel Burnham that stated Drexel Burnham's confidence in arranging
financing for NX's tender offer would not harm IU shareholders. 74
In analyzing the harm to IU shareholders, IU court observed that
Congress delegated to the SEC the authority to determine the specific
disclosures that would protect shareholders in a tender offer.7 The text of
the Williams Act is silent on when a bidder must have firm financing for
a tender offer.76 The SEC has interpreted the Williams Act and SEC
regulations not to require a bidder to have firm financing or to disclose
expected sources and terms of a bidder's financing before a bidder com-
mences a tender offer. 77 Because the Williams Act is silent on the firm
financing issue and because the Williams Act delegates authority to the SEC
to draft specific rules for disclosures, the IU court was correct in deferring
to the SEC's interpretation of the Williams Act and SEC regulations.
7
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Williams Act and SEC
regulations in IU is consistent with the opinions of all other federal courts
that have addressed the firm financing issue.79 For example, in Newmont
accompanying text (discussing SEC's prompt payment regulations). In IU the SEC, as amicus
curiae, indicated that if a bidder pays the shareholders within five days after the bidder's offer
expires, the bidder's payment to shareholders is prompt. IU, 840 F.2d at 223.
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (authorizing SEC to make rules and to take action to
prevent fraud in tender offers); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-b(5) (1988) (listing SEC rules on what
actions constitute fraud by bidder in tender offer). In IU the SEC, as amicus curiae, indicated
that if bidder chose to allow the bidder's offer to expire without the bidder having firm
financing, the SEC would examine the bidder's offer for fraud. 1U, 840 F.2d at 224.
74. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing 1U court's reasoning that
NX's disclosures to IU shareholders did not harm IU shareholders); supra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text (analyzing IU court's reasoning that NX's failure to disclose expected
sources and terms of NX's financing did not harm IU shareholders).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982) (authorizing SEC to prescibe disclosure of infor-
mation necessary to protect public interest or investors); Newmont Mining, 831 F.2d at 1451
(observing that Congress gave SEC wide latitude in which to determine disclosure requirements).
76. See Newmiont Mining, 831 F.2d at 1450 (noting that Williams Act is silent on question
of appropriate point in tender offer at which bidder must receive firm financing for bidder's
tender offer). The Newmont Mining court found nothing in the text of the Williams Act, in
the legislative history of the Williams Act, or in the SEC regulations that indicated that a
bidder must disclose financing information to the shareholders of the target company at the
outset of the bidder's tender offer, Id.
77. See IU, 840 F.2d at 224 (stating that SEC as amicus curiae in IU argued that no
requirement that bidder receive firm financing to commence tender offer exists); Newmont
Mining, 831 F.2d at 1452 (recognizing SEC's position that Williams Act and SEC regulation
do not require bidder to obtain firm financing before bidder commences tender offer).
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's authority to decide
specific disclosure requirements); supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing silence of
Williams Act on firm financing issue).
79. See Newmont Mining, 831 F.2d at 1453 (holding that bidder, in commencing tender
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Mining Corp. v. Pickens10 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered whether the Williams Act requires a bidder to have
arranged firm financing at the inception of the bidder's tender offer." In
Newmont Mining T. Boone Pickens and others (the Pickens Group) made
a tender offer of $3.3 billion for the shares of Newmont Mining Corpora-
tion.82 The Pickens Group disclosed that Drexel Burnham was highly con-
fident of arranging $1.1 billion in financing through the issuance of debt
instruments for the Pickens Group's purchase of Newmont shares.83 New-
mont brought an action against the Pickens Group in the United District
Court for the District of Nevada.14 Newmont, in asserting that the Williams
Act requires a bidder to have arranged firm financing and to disclose the
sources and terms of a bidder's firm financing, claimed that the Pickens
Group's disclosure of a letter from Drexel Burnham that only indicated
Drexel Burnham's confidence in arranging financing for the Pickens Group
violated the Williams Act.8" Newmont, in claiming that the Pickens Group's
failure to disclose the actual sources and terms of the Pickens Group's
financing violated the Williams Act, requested the court to enjoin the
Pickens Group's tender offer.86 The district court in Newmont Mining denied
Newmont's request for a preliminary injunction. 7 Newmont Mining Cor-
poration appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.88 In determining that the Pickens Group's
disclosure did not violate the Williams Act, the Ninth Circuit in Newmont
Mining recognized Congress' intent, in enacting the Williams Act, to require
disclosures in a tender offer and to empower the SEC to decide which
disclosures are necessary to protect shareholders of a target company.8 9 The
offer without firm financing, did not violate Williams Act or SEC regulations); Warnaco, Inc.
v. Galef, Civ. No. B-86-146 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd mem., 800 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that Williams Act and SEC regulations do not require bidder to obtain firm financing
before a bidder may initiate tender offer); Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp.
1535, 1541 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (reasoning that no requirement exists that would force bidder
to have funding before bidder commences tender offer).
80. 831 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
81. Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens, 831 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
82. Id.
83. Id. In Newmont Mining the Pickens Group disclosed that, in addition to Pickens'
prospective $1.1 billion financing arrangement from Drexel Burnham, the Pickens Group had
raised $600 million in equity and had commitments from lenders for $1.5 billion to fund
Pickens' tender offer for Newmont Mining stock). Id.
84. Id. at 1448.
85. See id. at 1449, 1450 (discussing Newmont management's claim in Newmont Mining
that Williams Act requires bidder to have firm financing when bidder commences tender offer).
86. Id. at 1448.
87. See id. (discussing district court's decision in Newmont Mining).
88. Id. at 1449.
89. Id. at 1450, 1451. The court in Newmont Mining followed the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. of Congress' intent in enacting the
Williams Act. Id.; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing United States
Supreme Court's interpretation in Rondeau of legislative history of Williams Act). In analyzing
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Newmont Mining court recognized that the text of the Williams Act and
the SEC regulations that govern a bidder's disclosures are silent on when a
bidder must have firm financing for a tender offer.0 Because th6 Williams
Act and the SEC regulations fail to address the firm financing isstte, the
Newmont Mining court determined that a bidder may commence a tender
offer without previously having arranged all tdrms of financing. 91 The court
in Newmont Mining acknowledged that legi'latiorl was pending in Congress
that would require firm financing at the commencement of a tender offer.92
The Newmont Mining court viewed congressional and regulatoty debates
on whether to require firm financing prior to a tender offer as evidence
that changes in the regulation of the financing of tender offers must come
from Congress or the SEC, not from the courts.93 The Ninth Circuit in
Newmont Mining, therefore, affirmed the district court's decision not to
enjoin the Pickens Group's tender offer. 4 The IU court, in determining
that the Williams Act did not require a bidder to have firm financing before
commencing a tender offer, reied heavily upon the Newmont Mining court's
reasoning. 9s
Because of the prevalent and controversial use of letters to bidders that
indicates the investment banks's confidence in arranging financing for
bidders's tender offers (highly confident letter), Congress has considered
legislation that would require a bidder to arrange firm financing prior to
commencing a tender offer.9 6 Proponents of a firm financing requirement
the Williams Act the court in Newmont Mining cited the provisions of the Williams Act that
delegated authority to the SEC to decide which disclosure requirements are necessary to protect
shareholders in a tender offer. Id. at 1452. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982) (authorizing SEC
to require any information thht SEC decides is necessary to protect shareholders or public
interest).
90. Newmont Mining, 831 F.2d at 1450.
91. See id. (determining that Williams Act did not require bidder to provide shareholders
with all information at outset of tender offer).
92. See id. at 1453 (discussing House and Senate proposals that would change bidder's
financing requirements in tender offer); infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing House
and Senate proposals that would change bidder's financing requirements in tender offer).
93. See Newmont Mining, 931 Fl2d at 1453 (reasoning that congressional and regulatory
debate show thht Congress and SEC are proper bodies to require firm financing in tender
offers).
94. Id. at 1450, 1453.
95. See IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir. 1988),
aff'd en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with Newmont Mining court in rejecting
argument that Williams Act requirds firm financing before bidder may initiate tender offer).
The IU court also agreed with the Newmoit Mining court in determining that the SEC's prior
positions on firm financing issde did nit reveal inconsistencies with current SEC position. Id.
at 224.
96. See S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § ll(a)(i)(2)(B) (1987) (changing financing
requirements for bidders in tdnder offers); .ee alo H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7
(1987) (changing disclosure requirements for bidder in tender offer). The Senate proposal
would have required that, before a bidder may commence a tender offer, the bidder must
have sufficient funds to finance the offer on deposit in a bank, or legally enforceable,
unconditional and irrevocable commitments from a bank for the amount of the bidder's tender
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argue that highly confident letters from investments bankers to bidders lead
to abuse of tender offers by bidders that are not contending seriously for
control of the target companies but that attempt to manipulate the price of
a company's stock for quick profits. 97 Opponents of a firm financing
requirement argue that the highly confident letters from investment bankers,
like the letter from Drexel Burnham in IU, increase competition among
financing sources and make the capital markets more efficient. 9 The SEC,
in deciding not to require bidders to have firm financing to commence a
tender offer, determined that the marketplace and the courts adequately are
addressing takeover tactics, including the use of highly confident letters
from investment bankers by bidders. 99 Congress, however, by enacting the
Williams Act and delegating authority to the SEC to determine specific
disclosures requirements, did not intend for a court to impose the court's
offer, or a combination of cash and binding commitments. S. 1324, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. §
1 l(a)(i)(2)(B) (1987). The House proposal would have required bidder to disclose in the bidder's
initial filing with the SEC the conditions that a lender requires of a bidder before lender will
commit to finance the bidder's offer. H.R 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1987).
97. See BRANCATO, TAKEOVER Bins AND HIGHLY CoNFDENT Larraas 1-2 (Cong. Res.
Service 87-724E, August 28, 1987) (citing fears of possible manipulation of securities market
by tender offerors that have not arranged firm financing). In initiating tender offers, bidders
frequently use letters from investment bankers to bidders that indicate the investment banker's
confidence in arranging financing for the bidder's tender offer (highly confident letters). The
low cost of obtaining a highly confident letter relative to commitment from a commercial
bank encourages a bidder to make the bidder's offer conditional on the bidder receiving
financing. Id. at 15. Some members of Congress and investment bankers are concerned that
the relatively low cost of obtaining a highly confident letter and the incentive for an investment
banker to issue the letter may allow an insincere bidder to "put a company into play". Id.
at 2. By putting a company into play, the insincere bidder hopes to manipulate the price of
the target company without committing the bidder to purchase the shares that shareholders
tender. Id. at 15.
98. See id. at 8-10 (outlining argument that highly confident letters compete with
commercial bank's lending commitments in market to provide capital for tender offers). Some
investments bankers argue that, because highly confident letters are as reliable as conditional
commercial bank commitments in tender offers, Congress should not single out highly confident
letters for additional regulation. Id. at 21. Investment bankers claim that investment banking
firms before rendering highly confident letters exercise due diligence in examining the merits
of the bidder's offer and the probability that the offer will succeed. Id. at 9. Investment
bankers also claim that, if an investment banker failed to arrange financing for a bidder after
issuing a "highly confident" letter, the market for capital financing would view that investment
banker as unreliable and not furnish more chances for the investment banker to issue financing
letters. Id.
99. See BRANCATo, supra note 97, at 21 (discussing letter from SEC Chairman John
Shad to Chairman of House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance). In the letter the SEC chairman recounted the SEC's positions concerning
takeover tactics, including the use of highly confident letters in tender offer. Id. at 20. The
SEC chairman reported that members of the SEC unanimously concluded that the marketplace
and courts adequately were addressing takeover tactics. Id. at 21. The SEC, therefore, did not
recommend any law or regulation that would require bidders to have firm financing to
commence a tender offer. Id. See Newmont Mining, 831 F.2d at 1453 (tating that SEC, after
considering firm financing requirement, decided not to require that bidder have firm financing
before bidder commences tender offer).
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view of fairness in overseeing a tender offer. 100 The Fourth Circuit, in
analyzing only the potential harm to IU shareholders from NX disclosures
and compliance with the Williams Act, properly left the economic and
social issues of tender offer financing to the Congress and the SEC.'0° Until
the Congress or the SEC require a bidder to have firm financing, the court's
decision in IU allows bidders to continue using the highly confident letters
from investment bankers in initiating tender offers.
102
In 1U International Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp. the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of IU's motion for a
preliminary injunction against NX's tender offer because NX's disclosure
of the highly confident letter from Drexel Burnham met the narrow sub-
stantive requirements of the Williams Act and did not harm IU share-
holders. 03 In holding that NX's disclosures complied with the Williams Act,
the court in IU recognized the United States Supreme Court's determination
that a narrow construction of the substantive requirements of the Williams
Act closely adheres to Congress' intent that the Williams Act would remain
neutral in tender offers."14 In holding that NX's disclosure did not irreparably
harm IU shareholders, the IU court also properly determined that a disclo-
sure of the expected sources and terms of NX's financing would not have
given IU shareholders additional time or information with which to consider
100. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (reasoning that,
through federal security lav and through SEC, Congress consistently created requirements and
safequards that emphasize shareholder choice in tender offers). The Schreiber Court determined
that judges are not to oversee tender offers for substantive fairness but judges are to determine
whether the tender offer meets the broad disclosure requirements and the narrow substantive
requirements. Id. See also Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969) (reasoning that no tender offer is perfect and courts should not impose
unrealistic laboratory conditions on tender offers).
101. See IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1988),
aff'd en banc, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988) (determining that SEC could require firm financing,
but noting that SEC has not taken action on firm financing issue); Newmont Mining, 831
F.2d at 1453 (reasoning that debate over issue in Congress and at SEC indicates that firm
financing issue is legislative or administrative matter); supra notes 96-98 and accompanying
text (discussing proposals in Congress that would change financing requirements in tender
offers and discussing social and economic arguments regarding proposals to change requirements
for bidder's financing of tender offers).
102. IU, 840 F.2d at 225 (determining that NX's disclosure, including mention of highly
confident letter, was proper because NX had disclosed all NX knew about NX's financing for
NX's tender offer). See supra notes 96-98 (discussing controversial use of highly confident
letters in tender offers).
103. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing IU court's holding that NX's
disclosure complied with Williams Act); supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing U
court's holding that IU failed to establish that NX's disclosure would irreparably harm IU
shareholders).
104. See supra notes 28, 38 and accompanying text (discussing IU court's reliance on
decision of United States Supreme Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., which interpreted
Congress' intent to remain neutral); supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Rondeau
Court's interpretation of legislative history of Williams Act).
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NX's firm financing.os Moreover, the IU court, in holding that neither the
Williams Act nor the SEC regulations require firm financing or disclosure
of expected sources and terms of financing, appropriately deferred to the
SEC's authority under the Williams Act to draft disclosure rules for tender
offers.'10 The IU court's interpretation and analysis agreed with all other
federal courts of appeal that have addressed the firm financing issue.'0 7 By
refusing either to interpret broadly the terms of the Williams Act or to
assume authority that properly rests with the SEC, the IU court has allowed
bidders in the Fourth Circuit to continue to use highly confident letters
from investment bankers to initiate tender offers until Congress or the SEC
changes the financing or disclosure requirements in tender offers.'10
ROGER ALSuP
105. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing IU court's reasoning that
disclosure of expected sources and terms of bidder's financing does not affect timing and
content of bidder's disclosure of actual sources and terms of financing); supra note 69-72 and
accompanying text (analyzing IU court's reasoning that NX's failure to disclose expected
sources and terms of NX's financing to IU shareholders did not harm IU shareholders).
106. See supra notes 75, 76 and accompanying text (analyzing IU court's reasoning in
deferring to SEC's authority to determine specific disclosure requirements in tender offers).
107. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing prior federal court opinions on
firm financing issue).
108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing effect of highly confident letters
on market for capital that finances tender offers); supra note 101 and accompanying text
(discussing IU court's recognition that only SEC and Congress have power to change disclosure
requirements in tender offers).
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